Continuity of Operations (COOP) and Continuity of Government (COG): Proposal for their implementation in Latin America and the Caribbean
# Contents

## Foreword

## Executive Summary

### I. Introduction

#### II. Continuity of Operations and Government

1. Historical background
2. Three conceptual levels of Continuity: Operations, Government and Development
3. Objectives of Continuity of Operations and Government
4. Conditionally complementary strategies for Continuity of Operations and Government
5. Basic elements of the Plan for Continuity of Operations and Government
6. International experiences

#### III. Conclusions: Main Challenges

1. Thinking that we know more than we really do
2. Government institutions are responsible for responding to catastrophic events but it does not make them immune from being affected
3. Institutionalization of COOP and COG in the countries of the region

#### IV. Recommendations

1. Substantive recommendations
2. Operational recommendations

## Annexes

1. Template for a Plan for Continuity of Operations
2. List of Regional Legislations on Continuity of Operations and Government: Consulted documents
3. International standards on Continuity of Operations and Government

## Acronyms

## Charts and Tables

## Bibliography
FOREWORD

This document was drafted in compliance with the Work Programme of the Permanent Secretariat of the Latin American and Caribbean Economic System (SELA) for 2013, Project II.1 “Strengthening economic and technical cooperation in Latin America and the Caribbean, in line with the mandates of CELAC”, which envisages Activity II.1.3, “Partnership between public and private sectors for disaster risk reduction in Latin America and the Caribbean. Promoting strategic alliances with the private sector.”

The study is a contribution of the Permanent Secretariat to encourage the discussions and debates that will take place during the II Regional Seminar “Partnership between public and private sectors for disaster risk reduction: Continuity of government and continuity of business operations during disasters”, to be held in Cartagena, Colombia on 1 and 2 August.

The document comprises an introduction and three chapters dealing with following issues: i) Continuity of Operations and Government, which refers to the historical background of continuity, its conceptual levels, objectives, strategies, basic components and related international experiences; ii) Conclusions: Main challenges, which focuses on the achievements and pending actions as regards continuity as well as the great challenges that we face as institutions and as a society, which call for joint actions and permanent preparedness to confront even the worst scenarios; and ii) Recommendations, which contains a series of proposals in various fields that could be jointly materialized by government authorities and the private sector.

This study was prepared by consultant Ana Lucía Hill Mayoral, to whom the Permanent Secretariat wishes to express its gratitude and recognition.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Public or private enterprises that provide basic services to people in Latin American and Caribbean countries can be affected by any emergency or disaster situation. The population expects governments to be responsible for being prepared to face adverse scenarios and to ensure stability and permanence of State institutions, regardless of the levels of damage.

Disasters can cause great damage. Particularly, the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean can face potentially paralyzing economic and social costs. The economic and social development of the region could be hampered because of disasters if preventive measures are not taken to mitigate their negative impact.

The concept of continuity in its three conceptual levels – continuity of operations (COOP), continuity of government (COG) and continuity of development (COD) – emerges today as one of such preventive measures and as a useful institutional tool for mitigation to deal with risk scenarios in the region. COOP allows for guaranteeing that public institutions do not interrupt their activities in case of a crisis. COG allows for ensuring the legal validity of the pre-existing government, protecting the general interests of society, safeguarding the legitimately established form of government and enforcing the constitutional and political order. And COD guarantees basic operating and institutional coordination conditions that allow for mitigating the impacts of disasters on development.

Efforts to work on the concept of continuity, to incorporate it into the preventive planning of government institutions and to promote it among representatives of the private sector can be identified in Latin American and Caribbean countries. There are different levels of implementation. While some countries are already working in the execution stage, there are others that are just starting the process of including the concept into national regulations.

The concept of continuity is not new. It has been linked to risk management for several years now. It is not considered as an activity to be conducted during a disaster, it is rather

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2 “Risk Management” can be translated as “Manejo de Riesgos” or “Gestión de Riesgos”. However, in Spanish, there is a difference between these two terms. “Manejo de Riesgos” involves a collective system of risk management arrangements, whereas “Gestión de Riesgos” implies individual and specific actions for a single purpose. The Dictionary of the Royal Spanish Academy defines “manejo” as “dirección y gobierno de un negocio” (management and governance of a business); “manejar” as “governar, dirigir” (govern, manage); “gestión” as “acción y efecto de gestionar” (action and effect of making an arrangement); and “gestionar” as “hacer diligencias conducentes al logro de un negocio o de un deseo cualquiera” (make an arrangement, or run an errand, to accomplish a business or any given purpose) (“diligencia” is defined as “trámite de un asunto administrativo, y constancia escrita de haberlo efectuado”; i.e. processing of an administrative issue and written record of having completed it). According to such definitions, the term “manejo” is much broader because it implies a complex process involving teaching and learning, researching and experimenting, modelling and training, studying and projecting, as well as investing and evaluating. In turn, the term “gestión” – although it is often used in the countries of the region – means to carry out specific arrangements. Carrying out specific arrangements (“gestión”) will always form part of managing and governing an organization (“manejo”). Therefore, in Spanish, the term “manejo de riesgos” (risk management) entails organizational flexibility in decision making, providing the ability of handling scenarios as necessary in order to increase the abilities and capacities of response of a any company, organization or government in facing risk scenarios, whereas “gestionar” refers to specific actions. “Manejo” involves a comprehensive and integrating approach; “gestión” refers to the necessary actions to achieve a single purpose. In our field of work, adopting a comprehensive and integrating approach for risk management (manejo de riesgos) allows for working, in a coordinated and pre-emptive manner, with complex scenarios in which systems and subsystems can interact, and for understanding risk within its own context; whereas the term “gestión de riesgos” refers only to isolated efforts. These remarks are based on our professional and academic experiences.
a daily task that allows for guaranteeing services and sustainability. For its implementation, it is necessary to identify the policy, guidance, and procedures to follow.

The planning process of continuity of operations lacked a sense of urgency before the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The attacks revealed complex scenarios, as well as high levels of vulnerability and interdependence between key processes and functions, which highlighted the importance of preventing risk scenarios and acting accordingly, with such sense of urgency.

A well-outlined plan for continuity of operations and government must foresee the participation of those public and private institutions which constantly interact when performing their duties. Such strategic partnership requires communication channels and exchanges of information that allow both parties to accomplish their goals. On the one hand, the private sector needs to know the threats and the level of risk faced by government institutions in order to undertake its own risk control and mitigation strategies as part of its COOP plans. On the other hand, government institutions need private organizations and society, as a whole, to join their capacities for preparedness and response to crisis scenarios so as to guarantee safe and resilient communities, which are able to deal with adverse scenarios, continue operating during crises and recover from them.

I. INTRODUCTION

Emergencies or disasters resulting from natural phenomena, or intentional or accidental human intervention might potentially interrupt the operations of public institutions and society. An institution might adopt certain measures to cope with risks, and hence, avoid the high costs of disasters: political, economic and/or social. Some organizations would be able to cover those costs, while others would be incapable of opening their doors again because they were not cautious enough.

This document is intended to be a tool for private and public institutions, particularly those offering basic services for the functioning of society in the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean. By means of the Continuity of Operations (COOP), the Continuity of Government (COG), and the Continuity of Development (COD), the institutions generate preparation and response capabilities to reduce the negative impact of a disaster, allowing them to operate responsibly facing a real expectation, a valid expectation of the population, and also allowing the institutions that offer services to keep working in spite of the scenario those institutions might have to face. The present document includes the historical background of the concept of Continuity, the essential elements of a plan for COOP and COG, a basic outline of a plan's contents, plus some recommendations to accomplish the implementation process of a Continuity strategy in the prevention and risk reduction efforts that are currently being carried out in the region's countries.

There have been many endeavours on this matter; however, there is still a long way ahead. The concept of Continuity has been already adopted in some countries of the region, and its implementation has been recorded in other countries; at least that is the conclusion after checking the current normative documents.

COOP, COG and COD demand a strong institutional commitment, political will, and social responsibility. This is possible by recognizing that emergencies are inevitable, but measures can be implemented in order to ensure a minimal negative impact following these events.
II. CONTINUITY OF OPERATIONS AND GOVERNMENT

1. Historical background

The concept of continuity is not new. It might be more easily identified by going back to the war scenarios of the Contemporary Era, when this concept was applied professional and systematically. An important example of the implementation of Continuity occurred during the First World War, when Great Britain, considering the threat posed by aerial bombings to its population and institutions, applied the first massive evacuation plans to face large-scale emergency scenarios. Those plans were fully implemented during the Second World War and they did not only establish criteria to evacuate the population in areas under bombardment, but also included the relocation of strategic jobs and activities in the English society. In this way, the Art Collection of the National Gallery, the Central Bank of England, the productions of the BBC television network, the postal services, and numerous private businesses were relocated. The Plan was also enforced to relocate nearly 23,000 public servants, so they could work in safer places, and to relocate the War Cabinet and the Parliament.

Later on, during the Cold War, facing the threat of a nuclear attack, it is possible to identify the construction of shelters for the population or bunkers for the government authorities to keep them and the communities safe. Civil Defence during the Cold War period, from the 1950s, centred on a key element in spite of the differences among the countries: risk management.

It was precisely during the 1950s and 1960s when the debate over Continuity became important, considering the threat of a nuclear war or attack. As a response to such catastrophic scenario, the efforts were refocused to ensure the permanence of the government institutions and to uphold the political leadership and the constitutional order through the establishment of parallel government structures.

Since the premise of civil defence and government continuity was grounded on the risk and imminence of a nuclear war, the involvement of the countries' armed forces was an expected aspect. Nevertheless, in the case of the United States, for example, the declining image of the Army due to its performance in the Vietnam War caused that by the end of the 1970s the concept of civil defence was broadened to include not only armed conflicts, but also emergencies and disasters of any kind. Thus, the concept of planning was adopted for any types of risk.

Civil defence programmes took into account three types of concerns: recovery, protection, and integration. The Continuity of Government arose from the latter concern in order to exert a more active and permanent role (Davis 2007:23).

As the Cold War finished, the latent threat of a nuclear attack disappeared, along with the efforts to establish a Continuity of Government strategy.

However, after the turn of the century, and as response to the terrorist attacks against the World Trade Centre in New York; and against the Pentagon, in Washington, on September 11, 2001, the debate on having a Continuity of Government strategy regained importance and interest. The main concern of this new endeavour was to figure out how to hold the political and constitutional leadership, and how to ensure the continuity of operations and the provision of key government services.

Not only the war scenarios or the most recent terrorism scenarios fuel the interest in working on a strategy with this scope. The risk scenarios due to natural phenomena or to
accidental human intervention might also disrupt the everyday work of people, families, companies and institutions.

The globalised world in which we live has shown us that the disasters occurring in a certain country might have important repercussions beyond its borders. The Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (best known as SARS), which caused 800 deaths in 2002-2003, also had direct and indirect impacts on the global economy. This put us on the alert about those global risks we can be exposed to or the correlative crisis that might hit us following its contagion or indirect effects in other countries.

In 2009, Mexico experienced a similar scenario due to the Human Influenza. The tourism sector was one of the most affected sectors. The Confederation of National Chambers of Commerce, Services, and Tourism reported that sales in commercial establishments had dropped 60% on average, with estimated losses of approximately 8.22 billion Mexican pesos. The cancelation of previously planned travels was influenced by uncertainty and mistrust.

In that moment and as part of the preventive measures implemented by the government of Mexico, its continuity plans were adopted. Hence, the partial closure of government offices and of non-crucial offices for its functioning was announced. Also, an appeal was made to private enterprises to close their doors, except those offering key services to the population: transport, garbage disposal, hospitals, pharmacies and supermarkets.

On 1 November 2009, the World Health Organization reported confirmed cases of Human Influenza in 199 countries, territories, and communities, including 6,000 deaths.

Today, as in 2002 and 2009, the health care sector warns us about similar scenarios. A possible global pandemic caused either by the H7N9 virus in China or by the Mers-CoV in the Arabian Peninsula would result in the loss of at least 40% of the work force. So the question remains: Are we prepared for such event? Is it contemplated in our plans?

Other scenarios posed by hurricanes or a prolonged and severe drought also hit the production processes, commerce, our own lives, the lives of our families and the functioning of our institutions.

Extreme climates, earthquakes, tsunamis, volcanic eruptions, landslides, industrial accidents, terrorism or sabotage also generate scenarios that not only jeopardize people, but also the operation of our institutions and society.

Such events – local disasters with global consequences – put us all on the alert, including those people who have not yet been victims of a catastrophe. The disruption of the operations of the Public, Social or Private sectors might have a major impact on a particular sector, or start a chain reaction in other sectors. Therefore, a local or regional event might have repercussions nation-wide.

2. Three conceptual levels of Continuity: Operations, Government and Development

The concept of continuity involves three levels. The first level is Continuity of Operations (COOP), which is defined as a planning process to avoid interruptions in the work of public institutions and of society in case of a crisis. Continuity of Operations (COOP) is an effort carried out by each institution to ensure the operation of its basic functions when facing a crisis. COOP should involve both the public and private sectors.
Continuity of Operations is a multi-institutional instrument that must be previously established in order to ensure Continuity of Government (COG), which is the second conceptual level. At this level, Continuity is expected to ensure the legal validity of the pre-existing government, to protect the general interests of society, to safeguard the established and legitimate form of government and to enforce the constitutional and political order.

Thus, Continuity of Operations and Continuity of Government generate the conditions for basic functioning and institutional coordination, which allows for moving towards the third level: Continuity of Development (COD), whose priority is to mitigate the impact of disasters on the productive apparatus in order to avoid its financial collapse, to preserve productive activities and jobs, and to safeguard the functioning of the economy.

Horizontal and vertical cooperation among government institutions, along with the private and social sectors, are fundamental in the planning process to ensure and protect the economic stability of the country, and to guarantee an integral level of security for the population.

Continuity of Government requires each institutionalized power of the nation to have the necessary capacity to ensure its functioning.

**CHART 1**
Continuity Levels: COOP, COG and COD

For the Executive Power, **Continuity of Government** refers to the planning process that allows for ensuring the continuity of its responsibility and its role as State, as set forth in the Constitution. **Continuity of Operations** in the Government refers to the planning process that allows for ensuring its operation in any large-scale emergency or catastrophe scenario. In turn, **Continuity of Development** is the process by which the Executive Power ensures enough institutional, public policymaking (development planning) and management capabilities in order to become a factor in the social and economic development of society.

For the Legislative Power, **Continuity of Government** refers to the planning process that allows for ensuring the continuity of its legislative responsibility as set forth in the Constitution and its internal regulations. **Continuity of Operations** in the Congress refers to
the planning process that allows for ensuring its operation (analysis, preparation, discussion and voting of legislative initiatives) in any circumstance. For its part, Continuity of Development refers to the process to generate a legal order establishing the basic principles to ensure the concurrence among the sectors.

For the Judicial Power, Continuity of Government refers to the planning process that allows for ensuring the continuity of its judicial responsibility, as set forth in the Constitution, the federal laws, and its internal regulations. Continuity of Operations in the Judiciary is the planning process that allows for ensuring the operation of the Supreme Court (and also of courts and tribunals) in any circumstance. In turn, Continuity of Development refers to the complete observance of law enforcement through the provision of top quality justice administration services in a timely, fair, effective and transparent manner.

CHART 2
Continuity of Operations, Continuity of Government and Continuity of Development

3. Objectives of Continuity of Operations and Government

- To continue and ensure the operations of an organization when a crisis scenario of any kind arises, through:
  - Protection of the people's physical integrity and life;
  - Protection of private and public goods;
  - Maintenance of the minimal and essential functions of the institutions until the restoration of normal activities.

- Institutionalize, generalize and entrench the work on the subject of Continuity in the whole society, in order to:
– Protect intangible goods, because they generate capabilities to face a crisis in a timely manner.
– Make the political and social institutions responsible, because they build up confidence in the population and in the production.
– Foster a pragmatic mindset in institutions, with the purpose of reducing the negative impact of disasters.

4. Conditionally complementary strategies for Continuity of Operations and Government

Until the 1980s, the issue of disasters was focused on Civil Defence, with the intention of defending the population from a nuclear attack. In the countries where the threat of a nuclear attack was implausible or unlikely, and hence a strategy to tackle that contingency was lacking, the efforts were focused on dealing with local incidents through the emergency services and civil protection.

Thus, the emergency or disaster scenarios were tackled individually. Gradually, this approach has change and now the process of planning, strategy and emergency/disaster response is performed in a comprehensive manner for all kinds of scenarios (all hazards approach). These scenarios might be caused either by a natural phenomenon or by humans, accidentally or intentionally. These scenarios, individually and as a whole, require strategies to enable and ensure the operative and institutional continuity of the social actors and the governments to cope with risks.

For this reason, on the one hand, continuity of operations is intended to ensure that the society and State organizations continue performing their basic functions during an emergency scenario or when facing an incident likely to interrupt their daily operations. On the other hand, continuity of government is aimed at keeping the succession of the political leadership and the social legitimacy of governments, as well as maintaining the current constitutional mandate.

In consequence, the implementation of COOP and COG needs conditional strategies that complement each other, namely:

– Keeping the response capacity of governments;
– Shared vision, consensus and coordination among the territorial levels of government and among national powers, and coordination of these with civil and political society;
– Alliance between the Government and the Private Sector for Continuity of Production and Well-being; Growth and Development, and
– Involvement of the population at risk and the general population.

5. Basic elements of the Plan for Continuity of Operations and Government

5.1. Key/essential functions

The first step in the process to outline a Plan for COOP/COG is to identify the key functions or essential tasks of the institution. This may look easy to do, but it is not always so. The essential functions should be understood as those functions:

i. Defining the organization;
ii. Offering vital services to the community or to other organization to which they are suppliers (fuel, electric power, drinking water, food supply, healthcare);
iii. Performing authority actions or functions (authorizations, permissions, licenses, suspension of individual guarantees);
iv. Safeguarding the security and well-being of the general population (overall first responders: armed forces, police, medical emergency services, hospitals, firefighters);
v. Supporting the productive and industrial base during an emergency (raw material, transportation of goods, financial services.)

Once the essential functions are defined, then the interdependencies with other organizations should be identified, meaning, those functions of the organization which require the participation of another organization in order to be achieved. The simplest example of this aspect is the supply of electric power: if the systems on which the own essential functions depend need electric power – water supply, for instance – then the institution depends on the institution providing electric power services. This is the same case of communications or transportation services, if they do not have their own supply systems. Likewise, the processes of external organizations or institutions depending on the continuation of national organization's operations should also be taken into account, so that they can be also able to perform their functions. For this reason, it is important that the planning process is conducted under an inter-institutional approach.

5.2. Line of succession

Establishing the line of succession of the organization is of vital importance for COOP. Overall, mostly in public organizations, the internal regulations of the secretariats or ministries determine this line of succession based on the hierarchy of their own organization chart. Notwithstanding, if needed, and considering the nature of the responsibilities of an institution, it is possible to follow a line of succession different from the one that has been previous established, as long as such provision is registered in the corresponding legal documents. At least as far as the head of an organization concerns, it is convenient to designate up to four positions below in the line of succession. By establishing a line of succession, the organization is capable to carry out an organized and pre-defined transition of leadership.

It should be taken into consideration that successors may act on behalf and in representation of the principal, and perform his/her responsibilities in case of death or incapacity to carry out his/her duties. For this reason, successors should be in positions allowing them to know the functioning of the institution, and feature leadership and decision making capabilities.

A line of succession should also be established for other key positions within the organization. Key positions are identified by determining their essential functions. For these cases, it is recommended a line of succession of up to three people. Moreover, the line of succession should refer to positions or incumbencies, not to people, since it is a responsibility of the holder of the position.

The rules and procedures to be followed in case of succession should also be established. They might include:

I. Communication of the succession inside and outside the organization;
II. Operational period (for hours, days or unlimited);
III. Reasons for the succession;
IV. Legal grounds;
V. Inform (if applicable) the temporal, geographic, and/or organizational limitations of the successor.

The line of succession of the leader and other strategic positions, as well as the procedures and rules to perform them must be registered in the Plan, so that the members of the organization are aware of them and recognize the authority of the successor, in a given case.

5.3. Chain of command (decision-making)

In case of an emergency, the chain of command of an organization would be probably modified. This means to establish in the Plan for Continuity of Operations (PCOOP) which positions will have authority delegated by the leadership of the institution to perform specific tasks or functions. By doing so, it clearly identifies the people authorized to act on behalf and in representation of the organization for specific emergency purposes. This delegation of authority is independent from the line of succession, because it has to do with specific task and does not imply a transfer of all the responsibilities of the person who delegates.

Usually, the delegation of authority is applied when the chain of command breaks or is incomplete as a consequence of the contingency and it finishes when the chain of command is restored. The Plan must include the legal grounds regarding the delegation of authority and the limits of the person receiving the authority, namely, the reach of his/her competence and responsibilities.

The plan must also explain the circumstances in which the delegation of authority is applied and the conditions to conclude it. Certainly, those elements must be part of the vital information for the knowledge of the organization’s members.

5.4. Alternative offices

Determining alternative work places, in case it is not possible to continue operations in the main facilities of the organization, is a very important task; however, it depends on the amount of resources of each organization. In general terms, public organizations have a sufficient budget to set alternative work places. These, sure enough, would be smaller and less functional than the main headquarters, but they would ensure the execution of the PCOOP.

Since it is not possible to know the spread of the damage that a given phenomenon might cause, the best option would be having alternative offices in a different geographic location; however, this is not always possible. Overall, alternative offices should not be too near the main facilities.

The alternative facilities must have the emergency communication systems that were anticipated; areas for feeding, hygiene and rest for the key staff identified on the PCOOP, and access to the vital information included in the backup registers and databases. Moreover, alternative facilities must have food supplies and, if possible, medicines and special equipment that the staff might need over 30 days, or as many days as established in the PCOOP.

5.5. Interoperability of communications

The strategic management of communications is a fundamental element for the PCOOP. It is always important to underscore the significance of the communication systems (including infrastructure and contents) for the appropriate functioning of any organization, either public or private. Especially in case of emergency or disaster, the staff
must be able to communicate with the workmates inside the institution and with suppliers and external clients either via the usual means or via alternative means.

The emergency communication systems must provide connectivity - under any condition - to enable communications between the leadership of the organization and its members, as well as communication with other institutions, clients, suppliers, and general public, the latter mostly in the case of public institutions.

Interoperability is one of the features that the emergency communication systems must have. Nowadays, there are systems that enable communications between VHF and UHF signals, common telephony, mobile telephony, and voice over IP. The systems must also be portable, in order to maintain communications even when the key staff is in transit. In addition, it is recommended to have the system available immediately and able to operate for at least 30 days without need of maintenance or repairs.

Finally, the system must be available in the main and alternative facilities, and, if needed, in mobile communication units.

In general terms, private enterprises are the ones providing advanced communication services; despite the fact that some public institutions, especially those in charge of public security or the armed forces, might have and operate their own communication networks. Hence, this is an additional element that requires planning the characteristics and procedures of the emergency communication systems, together with those private suppliers.

5.6. Backup/Protection of information and databases

The vital information is the one required for the correct functioning of the essential functions. The information is kept in registers that can be in any storage medium, whether it is written, printed, sound recording, visual, electronic, computerized or holographic.

Certainly, the essential functions are as diverse as the vital information related to each of those functions. However, some of those functions are prone to be common, even among public and private organizations, namely:

i. Directory of the organization members, including telephone numbers as well as main and alternative e-mail addresses;
ii. Directory of suppliers;
iii. Directory of buyers;
iv. Records of accounts payable and receivable;
v. Payroll records;
vi. Work schedules per employee;
vii. Supplies stored in the warehouse;
viii. Information concerning insurance policies and insurance companies;
ix. Data concerning bank accounts, investment, and credits;
x. List of alternative work facilities;
xi. User names and passwords, as well as location of databases and backup computer systems.

Once the records and databases containing vital information are identified, alternative mechanisms to access that information must be designed, established and tested. For that purpose, several methods can be employed: from the most traditional and inexpensive, for instance, photocopies of the information to be safeguarded in two or three alternative facilities; to the acquisition of storage space in virtual hard disks, so once
all the information is digitized, it can be retrieved by authorized members of the organization via an Internet connection. The most convenient option is having a combination of physical systems with the printed information, if possible, plus electronic records, considering that both types of storage means have strengths and weaknesses.

Those mechanisms must also identify the organization policies concerning the level of access to the information that the members are granted according to their hierarchy; the procedure to get the information if the staff is dispersed; the conditions to update the information during the contingency; and the security measures to protect the integrity of the databases. It should be underlined that records and databases represent the memory and thinking of the organization, therefore, they must not be left unattended with the excuse of an emergency situation.

5.7. Management of Human Resources

Once the essential functions are identified in the most precise way, an analysis must be made of all the processes that the organization performs in order to accomplish such essential functions. This allows for separating the essential staff needed to carry out the function from the staff executing support tasks and that can be dismissed for a certain period. When this division is established, it is important to clearly state that everyone’s work is important, and that the fact of not being included in the roster of the PCOOP does not mean that someone’s daily effort is disregarded.

Secondly, another analysis must be made to know if, in case of emergency, the process can be carried out with less staff than usual, without compromising the quality of the process or the staff safety. This analysis allows for determining the minimal staff needed in case of contingency and also identify who they are. In this stage of planning, it is important to establish which members of the organization are trained to perform tasks in other areas, or in a given case, the members who require a minimal training to carry out such tasks. That way, a support internal staff structure is established to execute tasks in diverse areas in critical situations.

Third, it must be decided whether the situation demands the implementation of additional security measures, given the characteristics of the emergency or disaster. For instance, setting a decontamination zone to access the facilities; suspension of internal food services; use of personal protection equipment inside the facilities; or any other measure deemed necessary, according to the contingency.

Finally, schedules and work shifts might change in case of contingency. Therefore, the Plan must ensure a proper payment for extra hours or change of work shifts to the staff included in the roster of the Continuity Plan.

5.8. Update programme (socialization, simulations, decision-making exercises)

The PCOOPs of any institution must be instructed, tested and exercised to ensure that they meet the goals and objectives they bring forward. It is fundamental that the leadership of the organization is involved and engaged, so they can instill into the whole staff structure the importance of the Plan. The plans are not to be written and kept in the drawers of the planners; instead, plans must be for the knowledge of all the organization members. The fact of not being included in the roster of the PCOOP does not release any member from the responsibility of knowing and practicing the Plan.

The design and implementation of annual plans of exercises and simulations are very helpful for the process of knowledge or socialization of the Plan, and also to test its proper functioning. A successful exercise or simulation is not necessarily the one in which
everyone feel they did a good job, but rather one in which areas of opportunities and improvement are detected, and it is even possible to include lessons learned or best practices from other organizations. The plans must be constantly updated to ensure that the information, the procedures, and the legal grounds are up to date.

The exercises can be designed according to the size and needs of every organization. There is no need to perform functional simulations or large-scale exercises requiring a considerable amount of resources or the interruption of the regular work dynamics. However, any organization can organize seminars and desktop exercises to test the knowledge of the Plan, its appropriate execution, and to check whether it meets its goals and objectives. After an exercise, the most important thing is to get feedback from all the participating staff put to the test, because their opinions regarding the gaps of the Plan and the areas to be improved would be the most relevant.

Some examples of the type of exercises that can be conducted are:

- **Notification Process**: Those responsible for the Plan notify according to the activation protocols.
- **Step by step review of the Plan**: Each element of the planning process is presented verbally, according to what is established in the Continuity of Operations Plan.
- **Integrated Simulation-Exercise**: Includes a number of components to simulate the occurrence of a real incident.
- **Decision making exercise-Simulation**: Requires the development of large-scale emergency or disaster scenarios and presents the grounds for the activation of the plans.
- **Functional-Partial Simulation**: Some areas are put to the test.
- **Large-scale-Total Simulation**: Every element of the PCOOP is put to the test, both the strategic and operative elements, and not only the functional aspects, but also the ones related to geographic characteristics.

In summary, the key function that our institutions perform becomes the backbone (see Table 1) of every Continuity of Operations Plan. Once the essential function(s) of the organization is identified, it is possible to outline the required resources to accomplish those functions, the established controls to minimize the negative impact, the alternative methods to carry out the function, the dependencies and interdependencies concerning other areas and organizations, the information required, the foreseen risks and threats, and the analysis of impacts if the risk actually takes place.

### TABLE 1
**Basic elements of the PCOOP**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key Functions</th>
<th>Priority</th>
<th>Human Resources</th>
<th>Line of Succession</th>
<th>Alternative Methods / Recovery Strategies</th>
<th>Alternative Offices</th>
<th>Dependencies and Interdependencies</th>
<th>Information Backup</th>
<th>Risks</th>
<th>Business Impact Analysis (BIA)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

6. International experiences

The analysis of international experiences in Continuity is based on a review of the laws and regulations currently in force in the region as observed by the national and regional mechanisms for risk management.

**CHART 3**
Levels of implementation of the concept of continuity

As a result of this review, different levels in the implementation of this concept can be identified, all of which refer to institutional commitment as a key component, from the development of a conceptual framework to the establishment of criteria for its implementation.

**THE CARIBBEAN.** The Caribbean Disaster Emergency Management Agency (CDEMA)\(^3\) considers Continuity of Operations in its Enhanced Comprehensive Disaster Management Strategy and Framework by integrating aspects of disaster management to the planning of development and the processes of decision-making of its Member States. They have added it as a central theme of the Caribbean Conference on Comprehensive Disaster Management (CDM) and have supported the training process through the teaching of courses and workshops on Continuity of Operations to representatives of the private sector.

Through the Caribbean Disaster Mitigation Project\(^4\) it has been possible to verify that mitigation processes offer social and economic continuity in the communities by minimizing the social and economic disruption that accompanies a disaster scenario in the form of damage to transport and communication systems, resettlement of people, loss or interruption of work and closure or condemnation of businesses and/or schools.\(^5\)

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\(^3\) An inter-governmental agency established in 1991 by an Agreement of the Conference of Heads of State of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) to be responsible for disaster management, it is currently made up by: Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Saint Lucia, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago.

\(^4\) A five-year project carried out by the Unit for Sustainable Development and Environment of the Organization of American States (OAS) for the Caribbean Regional Programme of the U.S. Agency for International Development.

The report on the implementation of the Hyogo Framework for Action in the Caribbean States addresses the inclusion of the continuity approach in the legal and institutional frameworks at the national and regional levels. The Cayman Islands has a National Subcommittee – led by the private sector – to ensure economic continuity, but planning processes used by all sectors and small businesses still need strengthening. The Virgin Islands is committed to raising private sector’s awareness of the need to have continuity and recovery planning processes in place.

A workshop on the development and strengthening of legal frameworks in the field of emergency management in the 11 member countries of CARICOM and the Dominican Republic – coordinated by the Caribbean Emergency Legislation Project (CELP) – identified COG efforts made by Grenada, such as making all Government agencies and institutions accountable for the development of their own continuity and emergency response plans.

COLOMBIA. The law enacting the Colombian National Policy for Disaster Risk Management and establishing the Colombian National System for Disaster Risk Management is very specific as to the adoption of the concept of COOP. It establishes a systemic principle which will ensure the continuity of the processes, interactions and linking of activities through common courses of action and coordination of responsibilities. In addition to making Governors responsible as heads of the respective administrative branches, they are also required to put in place and maintain continued disaster risk management processes on their territory. Under this law all providers of telecommunications and network services must allow immediate access to and use of their networks and infrastructures to any carrier requesting it in order to meet the needs associated with a declared disaster situation so that a continued provision of telecommunications and network services can be ensured.

The Ministerial Directive No. 12/2009 provides guidelines to be used by the education authorities of the certified territorial entities in order to ensure the continued provision of educational services in emergency situations.

COSTA RICA. The concept of COOP in Costa Rica has been established by the Regulatory Authority of Public Services through provisions ensuring the supply of services. The COOP is also mentioned in the National Plan for Risk Management as a goal to reach by 2015.

ECUADOR. Article 312 of the Constitution of Ecuador establishes that the Government shall guarantee that public services and their provision are in line with the principles of compulsory nature, generality, consistency, efficiency, responsibility, universality, accessibility, regularity, continuity and quality.

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8 This document is available at: http://www.ifrc.org/docs/idrl/1057ES.pdf.
12 This document is available at: http://www.utelvt.edu.ec/NuevaConstitucion.pdf.
Ecuador has operationalized the concept of COOP through an Emergency Business Continuity Plan. With this Plan, Ecuador’s Technical Secretariat for Risk Management makes a contribution to strengthening preparedness of public and private institutions in the country to ensure the continuity of the productive activities and services in an emergency situation.

**EL SALVADOR.** Under Article 112, Title V of the National Constitution of El Salvador on Economic Order provides that Government is entitled to manage companies that provide essential services to the community in order to ensure the continuity of services, should owners or senior management of such companies be reluctant to abide by the legal provisions on economic and social organization.

Concerning the principles that should guide construction and enforcement of the Law on Civil Protection, Disaster Prevention and Mitigation, Subsection (g) of Article 3 establishes as a principle of continuity that the entities responsible for civil protection, disaster prevention and mitigation are permanent and their personnel, if necessary, must remain at the entire disposal of the authorities during the time required for appropriate management of national emergencies caused by disasters.

According to Article 1, this Law aims to effectively prevent, mitigate and respond to natural and manmade disasters in the country and, in such events, to provide service continuity and regularity so as to safeguard the life and physical integrity of people, as well as private and public property. Additionally, a National System for Civil Protection, Disaster Prevention and Mitigation is established and described as a set of interrelated and decentralized public and private bodies which will be responsible for formulating and implementing disaster prevention work plans as part of disaster risk management.

Meanwhile, the National Plan for Civil Protection, Disaster Prevention and Mitigation of the Directorate-General for Civil Protection, Disaster Prevention and Mitigation of El Salvador, as part of its Core Topic 7 on the design of mechanisms to manage processes of reconstruction and sustainable recovery, includes as one of its objectives to develop actions and measures to ensure life safety, access to and continuity of basic and vital services.

**GUATEMALA.** The Law of the National Coordinator for the Reduction of Natural or Manmade Disasters (1996) does not contain specifics about the concepts of COOP or COG but it does refer to the restoration of public services and lifelines in its Chapter I, Subject Matter and Purpose; Article 3 on the Objectives of the National Coordinator, paragraph (e): To develop plans and strategies in coordination with the institutions responsible for ensuring the restoration and the quality of public services and lifelines in case of disasters.

**HONDURAS.** As part of the Final and Transitory Provisions of the Law of the National System of Risk Management (SINAGER), Article 51 on the Board of Directors of the National
System of Risk Management (SINAGER) establishes that the current directors of the Permanent Commission of Contingencies (COPECO) will be replaced by the permanent members of the Board of Directors of the National System of Risk Management (SINAGER) as established by Article 6 of this Law, with the subsequent addition of temporary members after being elected in due form so that the Board of Directors of the National System of Risk Management (SINAGER) is complete. People representing government institutions who are permanent members of the Board of Directors of the National System of Risk Management (SINAGER) shall be appointed for the term of the Government - which is four (4) years - in order to minimize disruption in staff continuity, thereby avoiding that these positions are filled by an excessive number of different people.

Meanwhile, the Guide to the Functional Areas of the Centre of National Emergency Operations (COEN) does address the concept of Continuity of Operations in its section on health services when it claims that one of its objectives is to safeguard the health of those affected by the occurrence of an adverse event of any nature (either natural or man-made) by enabling and speeding up the response of the relevant institutions with an effective management of resources and coordination of actions to ensure the continuity and/or recovery of basic health services.

NICARAGUA. The National Plan of Disaster Response of Nicaragua clearly identifies continuity as one of its response actions by stating that it aims to ensure continuity, security and efficiency of basic services and infrastructure and public transportation after the initial phase of disaster management.19

MEXICO. Article 7, section VII of Mexico’s General Law of Civil Protection20 defines Continuity of Operations as a cross-sectional task with special emphasis on areas directly related to health, education, land management, urban/regional planning, preservation and use of natural resources, governance, and security. Under Article 2, section XII, this Law also establishes that this task should be carried out by public, private and social institutions.

The National Programme of Civil Protection 2008-201221 already contained the concept of Continuity in its three levels. The development of a Continuity Plan by federal public agencies and institutions remains unfinished despite efforts made since 200822 and after the A/H1N1 flu epidemic in 2009.

PANAMA. Article 16, Section I, Chapter IV – Prevention Actions, Risk Assessment, Training and Compliance Training23 of the Law reorganizing the National System of Civil Protection (SINAPROC) includes provisions relative to risk prevention and assessment, making clear that they are based on the probability of occurrence of an event which may cause an emergency or disaster, putting people’s life, health and security – and their property – at risk as well as continuity in vital services and the entire ecosystem.

19 This document is available at: http://www.disaster-info.net/PED-Sudamerica/leyes/leyes/centroamerica/nicaragua/sistemmac/Plan_Nacional_ante_Desastres.pdf.
20 This document is available at: http://www.diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/pdf/LGPC.pdf.
22 The Direction General for Civil Protection has issued a guide for the development of continuity plans, added to the Internal Programme of Civil Protection. See http://www.proteccioncivil.gob.mx/work/models/ProteccionCivil/Resource/60/1/images/pipc_re.pdf.
23 This document is available at: http://www.sinaproc.gob.pa/pdf_doc/DecretoEjecutivoNo177.pdf.
**PERU.** In Peru the concept of Continuity of Operations has been recognized by the Government through a law establishing the National System for Disaster Risk Management (SINAGERD). One of the general principles that govern disaster risk management is to establish a systemic approach with a multisectoral, integrated vision based on the sphere of competence, responsibilities and resources of public institutions, ensuring transparency, effectiveness, coverage, consistency, coherence and continuity in their activities in relation to other sectoral and territorial authorities. This systemic approach was then adopted by the National Disaster Risk Management Policy.

Article 34.3 of the Regulations under this Law confirms the concept of continuity by establishing that in order to ensure continuity of essential public services, State-owned companies, operators of public concessions and regulators, in a disaster preparedness, response and recovery scenario, shall develop, evaluate and implement contingency plans and other emergency management tools within the framework of the National Plan for Disaster Risk Management, maintaining active communication and coordination with local or regional authorities, as appropriate.

Peru also integrates the concept of COOP to national emergency response plans and programmes, not only concerning the functional operation of the institutions but also in connection with the existing information processes and systems.

**DOMINICAN REPUBLIC.** The Risk Management Law, in its Chapter 1 on the Fundamentals of the Risk Management Policy; Article 1 on the General Principles Guiding the Risk Management Policy; paragraph 4 on Coordination, establishes that national, regional, provincial, municipal and community authorities shall ensure that there is proper harmony, consistency, coherence and continuity in their activities in relation to other sectoral and territorial authorities.

**OTHER COUNTRIES.** Rules and regulations currently in force in Argentina do not explicitly include the concept of COOP but they do address the issue of recovery and restoration of basic services, which is also envisaged in the regulations of Chile, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela.

No evidence was found that the Coordination Centre for the Prevention of Natural Disasters in Central America (CEPREDENAC) is currently engaged in an effort of this nature, but the Centre has shown interest in developing a project that integrates the concept of continuity within the framework of the strategic alliances between the public and private sectors.

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24 This document is available at: http://www.indeci.gob.pe/objetos/secciones/MO==/Mw==/lista/MzEx/MzEy/201110131528221.pdf.
26 This document is available at: http://www.indeci.gob.pe/objetos/secciones/MO==/Mw==/lista/MzEx/MzE0/201110131549081.pdf.
28 This document is available at: http://www.desastre.org/home/data/pdf/articlas/esp/Ley%20sobre%20Gestión%20de%20Riesgos%20en%20Rep.%20Dominicana.pdf.
29 A regional organization of an inter-governmental nature under the control of the System of Central American Integration (SICA) working in the field of disaster prevention, mitigation and response. Its Member States include Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama.
30 Juan Pablo Ligorría, personal communication, 2013.
III. CONCLUSIONS: MAIN CHALLENGES

1. Thinking that we know more than we really do

One of the most important challenges facing COOP and COG is perhaps that those running government organizations and institutions recognize the importance of having a strategy like this. There is a tendency to believe that if we have not endured or gone through a crisis is because we are doing things well and not because previous work was done to prevent crises from occurring, and thus any effort or investment made in this regard is sometimes considered useless.

2. Government institutions are responsible for responding to catastrophic events but it does not make them immune from being affected

We must be prepared. We must preserve the ability of governments to respond. Hence it is important to anticipate adverse events and minimize the surprise factor. The better prepared the government institution is, the better positioned it will be to respond to catastrophic events generated by a “Black Swan”. According to Nassim Nicholas Taleb, a Black Swan is an incidental fact that is characterized by having three properties: (1) a Black Swan is highly unlikely; (2) a Black Swan is an event which is difficult to foresee, the probabilities of which are impossible to predict based on information available before its occurrence; and (3) a Black Swan brings about catastrophic consequences. Today we know that we cannot prevent certain things from happening, we cannot avoid the occurrence of Black Swans, but we can prepare to mitigate and minimize the adverse impact of such events.

3. Institutionalization of COOP and COG in the countries of the region

Apart from the adverse impact crises can have, they might also result in damage to the reputation of public and private institutions and a reduced confidence of the population in the institutional ability to prepare for and respond to emergency or disaster events.

Many examples can be found of what has been done or left undone in terms of continuity. The greatest challenge facing us - both institutionally and as a society - is to take action and always be prepared to deal with the worst possible scenario.

IV. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Substantive recommendations

The development of plans for Continuity of Operations and Continuity of Government in Latin America and the Caribbean should be promoted.

1.1. Political area

The Heads of State should understand, if the political will exists, that Continuity of Operations, Continuity of Government and Continuity of Development are a responsibility of the government.

1.2. Policy area

Effective national and/or regional mechanisms and procedures with sufficient authority to promote COOP and COG in the countries of the region should be established or strengthened.

Standard requirements, methodological guidelines and recommendations should be created and/or adopted for the design of COOP plans in the public and private sectors.

The scope of professional practice should be defined and regulated.

1.3. Economic and administrative area
Processes for awareness-raising and training of government officials and business leaders should be established and strengthened.

A combination of fiscally sustainable economic incentives should be used in order to encourage the private sector to work on the development of COOP plans.

1.4. A holistic approach to Continuity of Operations and Government
The importance of this COOP/COG/COD strategy lies in its holistic approach, a comprehensive and global approach which pre-emptively identifies potential risks and their consequences, and generates schemes for mitigation, responsiveness and risk transfer in order to protect society and its institutions.

2. Operational recommendations
The roadmap for the integration of a single strategy for Continuity of Operations and Government should be monitored - the planning process for the development of a Continuity of Operations (COOP) Plan includes at least five (5) steps.

2.1. Establishment of a Leading Group
Plan managers and decision makers need to be identified. It is essential for those who run the organization to form part of this Leading Group. No one can understand better than them the strategic importance of their institution, and its core functions. They are not responsible for designing the Plan, but for coordinating institutional efforts (See Chart 4).

CHART 4
Responsibilities of the Leading Group

2.2. Risk identification and impact analysis
Risk scenarios and mission-critical and/or sensitive processes should be identified and assigned an institutional priority level based on the probability of occurrence and the expected impact.

2.3. Development of the COOP Plan and related requirements
Strategies and actions to mitigate threats and risks should be put in place; analysis of applicable controls; establishment of alternate offices; identification of human and material requirements for operation (See Annex I).
2.4. Implementation process and definition of indicators
The COOP Plan and related testing exercises should be communicated effectively. An unknown plan is a non-existing plan. Indicators to evaluate both implementation and feasibility of the Plan should be defined.

2.5. Verification, updates and corrections
Annual audits should be scheduled, as should reviews for the identification of recently emerging risks, updates on changes in organizational structure or changes made in response to the feedback obtained from exercises or lessons learned.

Additional considerations should include:

- Development of protocols for action, reporting and notification of incidents;
- Establishment of alternative operational methods, agreed upon by all key actors, with an established or identified legal basis;
- Identification of triggering conditions for internal/external reporting processes;
- Definition of special (human, material and financial) requirements for the implementation of the institutional COOP/COG strategy.
ANNEX I

TEMPLATE FOR A PLAN FOR CONTINUITY OF OPERATIONS
This template provides the basic structure for a Continuity of Operations Plan, including basic instructions to be used as a guide for the development of the Plan. This template can vary depending on the operational needs of each organization.

CONTENTS

1. Introduction and Legal Basis

Insert text:

The Plan for Continuity of Operations (PCOOP) outlines operational procedures to maintain the key functions and criteria for recovering the substantive operations of __________________________________________________________________________.

This Plan was prepared in accordance with those contents recommended in (Identification of the guidelines, rules or standards used for the development of this Plan) which provide a basic structure for the creation of the Plan and call for the mainstreaming of the Continuity approach in the emergency preparedness and response plans and programmes of public, private and social institutions.

Vis-à-vis potential disasters that might cause disruption in the operations of public and/or private organizations, it is a high priority to have a comprehensive support mechanism in place to help organizations deal with any eventuality.

Therefore, the implementation of a COOP Plan is aimed at ensuring an uninterrupted running of substantive operations, processes and systems of institutions and agencies, as well as reducing the chances that such operations, processes and systems will ever collapse.

The ability to respond to any crisis is thus strengthened, while ensuring basic operations and reducing recovery times after any disruption in operations.

The implementation of the Plan for Continuity of Operations is based on the legal provisions described below:

_______________________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________________

2. Purpose

Insert text: Describe the objective of the COOP Plan

To ensure Continuity of Operations at __________________________________________________________________________ in case of:

a. __________________________________________________________________________
b. __________________________________________________________________________
c. __________________________________________________________________________
d. __________________________________________________________________________
e. __________________________________________________________________________
Thus ensuring its operations. The COOP Plan addresses the basic elements of a Continuity of Operations strategy, namely: essential functions, key personnel, alternate facilities and remote operation, line of succession and delegation of authority.

3. Applicability and scope

4. Key functions

The Plan for Continuity of Operations classifies essential functions based on their importance to the organization.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Priority</th>
<th>Key Function</th>
<th>Material Resources</th>
<th>Information</th>
<th>Dependencies &amp; Interdependencies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
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<td>5</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Material resources**: Those resources needed to perform the function. Identify where they are located and who is responsible for providing them.

**Information**: Information, directories, databases which are required to fulfil the functions.

**Dependencies & interdependencies**: Sometimes a function cannot be fulfilled without the cooperation of other units/departments; identify dependencies, include contact information of those running the unit and let them know that they are part of our COOP Plan.

5. Alternative facilities

If access to the premises of ___________________________ is not possible, the following alternative facility has been considered:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Alternative facility 1:</th>
<th>Location:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contact person:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landline phone:</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Mobile phone:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pager:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Should Alternative facility 1 be unavailable, the alternate facility will be:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Alternative facility 2:</th>
<th>Location:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Contact person:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Landline phone:</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Mobile phone:</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pager:</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Other:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Should both Alternative facility 1 and Alternative facility 2 be unavailable, the alternative facility will be:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Alternative facility 3:</th>
<th>Location:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Contact person:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Landline phone:</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Mobile phone:</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Pager:</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Other:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6. Line of succession and decision-making

Insert text:

The individual responsible for operations described in this Plan with decision-making authority in this organization is ________________________________.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Incumbent:</th>
<th>Landline phone:</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mobile phone:</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Instant Messaging:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pager:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>GPS:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the absence of ________________________, responsibility will lie with the following persons – acting as substitutes – in the order shown below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Substitute 1:</th>
<th>Landline phone:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mobile phone:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Instant Messaging</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pager:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>GPS:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
7. Functions to be performed by the team responsible for the continuity of operations:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Priority</th>
<th>Key function</th>
<th>Person responsible 1</th>
<th>Person responsible 2</th>
<th>Person responsible 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Include contact information for each person responsible.
8. Activation of the COOP Plan

Insert text:

The responsibility for activating this Plan lies totally or partially with __________________________, and in his/her absence such responsibility will rest with __________________________. The notification process starts with (define the notification protocol: the communication tree defined to activate the PCOOP will also be used to notify the end of the crisis and the start of regular operation.)

Upon activation of the PCOOP, you should indicate:

i. Whether it is an organization-wide activation (including all areas) or an activation affecting one or more specific areas only;
ii. Whether it is necessary to move to the designated alternate facility or not; and
iii. Whether it is necessary to use substitutes and reserves under this Plan or based on the anticipated workloads of the organization.

9. Plan testing, training and exercises

Insert text: Define a schedule of exercises to test the COOP Plan functionality.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Exercise</th>
<th>Person responsible</th>
<th>Date scheduled</th>
<th>Lessons learnt</th>
<th>COOP Plan proposed changes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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</tbody>
</table>

10. COOP Plan review and update

Insert text: Define the update process schedule. Identify the individual responsible for completing this process.

The Plan for Continuity of Operations of __________________________ will be updated:

iv. Establish time points in the year to update the Plan (regularity);
v. Following each incident based on “lessons learnt”;
vi. Each time any officials identified in this Plan change;
vii. As requested by the Leading Group.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date created/updated</th>
<th>Person responsible</th>
<th>Next scheduled review</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Annexes to the Plan (include as many annexes as deemed necessary).
ANNEX II

LIST OF REGIONAL LEGISLATIONS ON CONTINUITY OF OPERATIONS AND GOVERNMENT.
CONSULTED DOCUMENTS
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Document</th>
<th>Available at</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>General Contingency Plan for Emergency and Disaster Situations</td>
<td><a href="http://www.bvsde.paho.org/bvsacd/cd65/Plan_Influenza_Argentina.pdf">http://www.bvsde.paho.org/bvsacd/cd65/Plan_Influenza_Argentina.pdf</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>Law establishing the National Emergency Office, attached to the Ministry of the Interior</td>
<td><a href="http://www.disaster-info.net/PED-Sudamerica/leyes/suramerica/chilesistemnac/Ley_369.pdf">http://www.disaster-info.net/PED-Sudamerica/leyes/suramerica/chilesistemnac/Ley_369.pdf</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>National Plan for Risk Management</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Law adopting the National Policy on Disaster Risk Management and establishing the National System on Disaster Risk as well as other provisions</td>
<td><a href="http://www.mineducacion.gov.co/1621/articles-196228_archivo_pdf_directiva_12_2009.pdf">http://www.mineducacion.gov.co/1621/articles-196228_archivo_pdf_directiva_12_2009.pdf</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Document</td>
<td>Available at</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>General Law on Civil Protection</td>
<td><a href="http://www.diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/pdf/LGPC.pdf">http://www.diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/pdf/LGPC.pdf</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>Law establishing the National System for Disaster Prevention, Mitigation and Relief</td>
<td><a href="http://www.sinapred.gob.ni/index.php?option=com_wrapper&amp;view=wrapper&amp;Itemid=116">http://www.sinapred.gob.ni/index.php?option=com_wrapper&amp;view=wrapper&amp;Itemid=116</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>Law reorganizing the National Civil Protection System</td>
<td><a href="http://www.sinaproc.gob.pa/pdf_doc/DecretoEjecutivoNo177.pdf">http://www.sinaproc.gob.pa/pdf_doc/DecretoEjecutivoNo177.pdf</a></td>
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<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>Law creating the Secretariat for National Emergencies</td>
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<td>Act establishing the National System of Disaster Risk Management (SINAGERD)</td>
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<td>Supreme Decree approving the Regulations of Law No. 29664, which creates National System of Disaster Risk Management (SINAGERD)</td>
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Continuity of Operations (COOP) and Continuity of Government (COG): Proposal for their implementation in Latin America and the Caribbean

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INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS ON CONTINUITY OF OPERATIONS AND GOVERNMENT
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<td>Business Continuity Management. Keeping the wheels in motion</td>
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<td>ISO 17799:2000 (refer only to chapter 11: BCM)</td>
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ACRONYMS

BIA  Business Impact Analysis
IDB  Inter-American Development Bank
CARICOM  Caribbean Community
CDEMA  Caribbean Disaster Emergency Management Agency
COD  Continuity of Development
COG  Continuity of Government
COOP  Continuity of Operations
CEPREDENAC  Centre for Coordination of Natural Disaster Prevention in Central America
PCOOP  Plan for Continuity of Operations
CHARTS AND TABLES

CHART 1  Continuity Levels: COOP, COG and COD
CHART 2  Continuity of Operations, Continuity of Government and Continuity of Development
CHART 3  Levels of implementation of the concept of continuity
CHART 4  Responsibilities of the Leading Group
TABLE 1  Basic elements of the PCOOP
BIBLIOGRAPHY


